the globalized interconnected world we live in are some of the enabling factors that could lead to the Ebola virus disease reaching Latin America and Caribbean countries. A year ago nobody would have thought that Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were on their way to facing a devastating outbreak. Latin America and the Caribbean are already confronting serious epidemics of dengue and chikungunya viruses, with negative socioeconomic and health consequences for the region. 4, 5 Furthermore, the risk faced by the region with regard to emerging and reemerging infectious diseases may be illustrated in the increasing number of events of potential international public health concern. In 2014, 93 public health events of potential international concern were identifi ed and assessed in Latin America and the Caribbean. 6 Of these 93 events, 47 (51%) were of substantiated international public health concern that aff ected 27 countries and territories. The largest proportion of these 47 events was attributed to infectious hazards (34 events, 72%), and the etiology most frequently recorded was chikungunya virus (20 events) followed by zoonotic hazards.
The World Health Organization's determination of the Ebola virus disease outbreak as a public health event of international concern prompted nonaffected countries to implement measures to prevent, detect, and manage the introduction of the virus in their territories. The outbreak provided an opportunity to assess the operational implementation of the International Health Regulations' core capacities and health systems' preparedness to handle a potential or confirmed case of Ebola virus disease. A public health framework implemented in Latin America and Caribbean countries encompassing preparatory self-assessments, in-country visits, and follow-up suggests that the region should increase efforts to consolidate and sustain progress on core capacities and health system preparedness to face public health events with national or international repercussions. The International Health Regulations express the shared responsibility of countries for global public health through their commitment (1) to establish and maintain essential public health functions ("core capacity" detailed in Annex 1 of the International Health Regulations) to detect, assess, notify, report, and respond to public health events across the entirety of their territory; and (2) to promptly and transparently share information through established international channels regarding public health events that might have international implications. By June 15, 2014, 11 countries in the region had communicated to the World Health Organization (WHO) their self-determination that the core capacity was in place and could be maintained.
The 2015 report of the International Health Regulations Review Committee on extensions of the core capacity recognized that the continuous public health preparedness process requires a holistic approach to strengthening health systems to ensure that they are robust enough to allow the desired degree of fl exibility to prepare for, and respond to, rapidly emerging risks in an interconnected world. 8 At the same time, a more qualitatively and operationally oriented scheme for monitoring the implementation of the International Health Regulations-ensuring mutual accountability and sharing good practices among countries-will need to be developed. The Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa has provided the opportunity to reconsider the actual operational meaning and practical public health implications of the commitment to establish and maintain the core capacity. Furthermore, it has presented the international community and, more importantly, nonaff ected countries with the prospect of reassessing their health systems' actual level of preparedness to prevent, detect, and manage a potential or confi rmed case of Ebola virus disease and to implement the temporary recommendations issued in August 2014, when the outbreak was determined a public health emergency of international concern.
PREPAREDNESS AND RE SPONSE IN LATIN AMERI CA AND THE CARIBBEAN
To prevent the establishment of local transmission in Latin America and the Caribbean, considering the importation of a very limited number of potential or confi rmed cases as the most likely scenario, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) implemented the following approach including 4 major components:
1. the creation of an internal Ebola virus disease task force comprised of senior offi cers to lead and coordinate the institutional response, 2. the activation of the Organization Emergency Operation Center under the leadership of an experienced incident manager, 3. the establishment of a regional stockpile of protective personal equipment, and 4. the preparation of an ambitious plan targeting national authorities at the highest political and technical levels.
The main goal of this plan was to place the threat of Ebola virus disease on the agenda of the heads of state or government to ensure full commitment to preparedness for, and response to, Ebola virus disease and any other unusual health event. While focusing on Ebola virus disease, the objectives of the Framework for Strengthening National Preparedness and Response for Ebola virus disease in the Americas 9 were to characterize the capacity of the countries to respond to any emerging or reemerging infectious disease hazard, to support countries in addressing and bridging gaps identifi ed by suggesting and implementing corrective actions, and to defi ne a joint technical cooperation work plan to support national preparedness eff orts for emerging and reemerging infectious diseases.
The Framework for Strengthening National Preparedness and Response for Ebola virus disease in the Americas was tailored to the context of each country in various phases, including preparatory, implementation of in-country missions, and follow-up. The 3 phases required actions at both the political and technical organizational levels. The political phase aimed to foster country ownership through prospective missions, country commitment to mobilize all competent authorities from relevant sectors, and acceptance of the PAHO and partner recommendations on the basis of existing evidence, including the mobilization of resources for their implementation.
The
This phase also included revision and building on existing preparedness and response plansincluding those developed in relation to avian and pandemic infl uenza, cholera, and chikungunya-by identifying, adding, refi ning, and focusing on the operationalization of those components of the response specifi c for Ebola virus disease.
Countries' self-assessment with regard to preparedness was facilitated through a WHO checklist for the potential introduction of an Ebola virus disease case and through the countries annual report to the World Health Assembly as part of the International Health Regulations Core Capacity Monitoring Framework. 10 Technical missions were conducted in 27 of 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries-in collaboration with experts from partner agencies and upon acceptance by the national authorities-to generate recommendations for strengthening areas in need of improvement. Countries not visited included Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela because they did not request a mission. These countries, however, provided selfassessments and worked closely with PAHO country offi ces on the ground to address priority areas. In parallel, targeted multicountry training workshops for government-designated offi cials and expert consultations were conducted in several countries on clinical management, infection prevention and control, laboratory diagnostics, and risk communication.
The outcome of the missions indicated the need for further eff orts and investment of resources, which were substantial in some cases (Table A, available as a supplement to the online version of this article at http:// www.ajph.org). With few exceptions, the majority of countries visited need to enhance the awareness and ability of health care workers in health services across their territories to detect and report any unusual health event-including Ebola virus disease suspicions-and to manage them safely while the referral channels to the designated isolation area are activated. The role that well-trained health care workers play in ensuring the early warning function and rapid response still constitutes a major weakness in some countries. In addition, the refi nement of contact tracing and monitoring procedures and tools are needed.
Most of the countries had identifi ed designated isolation areas to manage a potential or confi rmed Ebola virus disease case by adapting and modifying spaces in existing health care facilities. However, only a few were properly equipped to safely treat a case; a limited availability of protective personal equipment is an example of this. Of the 11 biosafety level-3 laboratories in Latin American and the Caribbean only 6 had Ebola virus disease diagnostic capacity as of December 2014. The fi nalization of logistic and administrative arrangements for the international shipment of samples for confi rmatory diagnosis to 1 of the 2 biosafety level-4 laboratories at the WHO collaborating centers (the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta and the Public Health Agency of Canada in Winnipeg) continues to be a challenge in a few countries.
Finally, although almost all visited countries had existing risk communication strategies and plans, the extent to which these plans were implemented remain unclear. Furthermore, although several of the International Health Regulations core capacities were self-assessed by the countries in their annual report to the 68th World Health Assembly, the technical missions suggested the need for improvements in most capacities (Table  B , available as a supplement to the online version of this article at http://www.ajph.org).
There were also positive and encouraging fi ndings. Considering the fact that few Latin American and Caribbean countries had actually faced the importation of a potential Ebola virus disease case, or had conducted functional simulation exercises, the dedication and commitment to prepare for the introduction of Ebola virus disease greatly enhanced the level of confi dence and generated a higher level of awareness regarding public health risks among national authorities. The mechanisms activated or established to coordinate preparedness eff orts in most of the countries showed signs of improvement, as underscored by the allocation of the leadership role to an institution or high-level committee and by the intra-and intersectorial AJPH PRACTICE articulation of plans and procedures aimed at ensuring their interoperability. Follow-up missions, south-south and triangular cooperation, and a high-level dialogue tailored to each country according to its needs will be crucial to ensure progress and sustain the momentum.
CONCLUSIONS
Recognizing the heterogeneity of the majority of countries across Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as across the diff erent components of preparedness in general, our fi ndings suggest that preparedness in the region is reasonable but that the majority of countries will need to make modifi cations and enhancements and, most importantly, strengthen their institutions. Although no one size fi ts all, the improvements needed in several of the countries visited, if properly addressed, will serve to respond to Ebola virus disease and to other unusual health events without unnecessarily stretching countries' capacities to the detriment of other health priorities.
The current epidemics of dengue and chikungunya in several countries of the region and the recent introduction of Zika virus in Easter Island and Brazil are some of the examples of health events that can also benefi t from strong preparedness eff orts across the region. Furthermore, sound preparedness eff orts will mitigate the potential economic impact of such health events. Dengue illness in the Americas has been estimated to cost 2.1 billion dollars per year on average. 11 The chikungunya virus outbreak in Reunion Island incurred substantial medical expenses estimated at 43.9 million euros, of which 60% were attributable to direct medical costs related to consultations, hospitalization, and drugs. 12 A study on the 2009 H1N1 infl uenza outbreak in Mexico estimated that by losing almost a million overseas visitors, the country lost approximately 2.8 billion dollars, suggesting that the wider economic implications of health-related emergencies need to be considered in preparedness planning. 13 The degree of discrepancy between the gaps experts identifi ed during the country missions and the core capacity score self-assessments highlights the need to refi ne the monitoring approach and the metrics related to implementation and application of the International Health Regulations. A methodological approach to monitoring the International Health Regulations that is more objective and focused on the functioning of the public health system would increase the relevance of the International Health Regulations as the framework for global health security, while informing the investment and allocation of resources by national authorities and the donor community.
The encouraging signals that the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa is slowly being brought under control further reduces the risk of importation to Latin America and the Caribbean. Therefore, regional and country leaders should capitalize on the momentum resulting from Ebola virus disease preparedness activities to ramp up eff orts to consolidate and sustain progress made. While doing so, they must honor their commitment to the international community expressed through the International Health Regulations. Responding to and controlling a public health event without entering into crisis mode every time an outbreak hits the shores of Latin America and the Caribbean will be the best indicator that the region is better prepared to face public health events with national or international implications. Essential public health functions (core capacity detailed in the International Health Regulations) are an integral part of health systems, which must be resilient to ensure the achievement and sustainability of such capacities. 
